EXHIBIT 70

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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DEXIA SA/NV, DEXIA HOLDINGS INC.,
FSA ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC and
DEXIA CREDIT LOCAL SA, EFC Case

Plaintiffs,

vs. No. 12-cv-4761 (JSR)

BEAR STEARNS AND CO., INC., THE
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC.,
BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED
SECURITIES I LLC, EMC MORTGAGE
LLC (f/k/a EMC MORTGAGE
CORPORATION), STRUCTURED ASSET
MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS II, INC.,
J.P. MORGAN MORTGAGE ACQUISITION
CORPORATION, J.P. MORGAN
SECURITIES LLC (f/k/a JPMORGAN
SECURITIES INC.), WAMU ASSET
ACCEPTANCE CORP., WAMU CAPITAL
CORP., WAMU MORTGAGE SECURITIES
CORP., JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., and
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendants.

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* * *CONFIDENTIAL* * *

DEPOSITION OF ILYA ERIC KOLCHINSKY

New York, New York

January 30, 2013

Reported by:
MARY F. BOWMAN, RPR, CRR
JOB NO. 57294

Page 78 1 KOLCHINSKY - CONFIDENTIAL 2 this subject matter I have perform in that 3 scenario? 4 Right. And that step is an 0. 5 integral part of the methodology, right? 6 MR. LEBOVITCH: Objection to the 7 form. 8 It's an important -- you have to A. understand, again, it is a lot of variation. 9 10 For some securities like credit cards, where 11 you don't have a lot of information about the 12 pool, you use averaging, because you don't 13 have that information. 14 For RMBS, you may have loan-level, 15 you may have pool-level information. So that 16 second step is a step of saying, here is my 17 scenario, how does this scenario affect 18 whatever I am looking -- either it is a loan 19 by loan, it's -- you know, for CMBS where you have lease-level information, how does it 20 21 affect the lease? You know, if somebody 22 underwrites Worldwide Plaza where we are 23 sitting today, they're going to look at 24 Cravath, when is the lease running out, how 25 much are they paying, what happens at the end

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 2
      of that lease.
 3
               So the analysis that you do at that
 4
      credit model level really depends on what
 5
      information you have. So you can do pool
 6
     level, you can have loan level.
7
         Q.
               Again, I think we are getting
 8
      confused between what that analysis might
9
      entail versus just the simple existence of
10
      that analysis as an essential step in the
11
      approach to creating ratings or valuing a
12
      tranche of RMBS, and it is an essential step
13
     in the approach, correct?
14
               It is. You have to --
         A.
15
               MR. LEBOVITCH: Objection to the
16
         form.
17
         A.
               You need a step where you said,
18
      here is my scenario, here is my collateral,
19
      how does it perform. So that's an essential
20
     step.
21
               That's essentially based on some
         0.
22
      sort of quantitative modeling, correct?
23
               MR. LEBOVITCH: Objection to the
24
         form.
25
         A.
               Generally it is based on
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1
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2
     quantitative modeling, yes.
3
         Q.
               The third step you mentioned is,
 4
     what you described, what you called sort of a
5
     waterfall model or the effects on the
6
     different tranches --
7
         A.
               That is correct.
8
         Q. — in the structure of the
9
     security?
10
         A.
               That is correct.
11
               Now, is that step, which I
         0.
12
     understand could be analyzed in different
13
     ways, but is that step an essential process
14
     of the methodology for rating RMBS tranches
15
     and valuing RMBS tranches in the work that
     you have done either at rating agencies or
16
17
     for the insurance commissioners?
18
               MR. LEBOVITCH: Objection to form.
19
               Again, I'm going to -- before I
         A.
20
      answer, I want to detail some of the
21
      variation you have. You have securities that
22
      are pass-through securities where you don't
23
     have any tranching. You have securities
24
     where you have an immense amount of tranching
25
      changes, not just subordination, but switches
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2
     between cash flow.
3
               So the amount of work you do on
4
     that process really depends on the structure
5
     you are looking at. But that obviously if
6
     you have a structure, you have to understand
7
     how the effect of the collateral affect now
8
     the structure.
9
               And then the fourth step is
         Q.
10
      essentially the output of the first three
11
     steps, the valuation of the tranche of
12
     securities or the rating that gets applied to
13
     them, right?
14
              That is correct.
         A.
15
         O. So we talked a little bit about
16
     your work at Moody's, within Moody's Investor
17
     Services, up until the end of 2007. Then
18
     from the end of 2007 until September of '09,
19
     you worked in a different division of Moody's
     called Moody's Analytics, right?
20
21
         A.
               Yes. That is correct. It became
22
     to be known as Moody's Analytics.
               So at Moody's Analytics, I just
23
         Q.
24
     want to understand, specifically, were you
25
     involved in the rating of RMBS tranches?
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1
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2
         A.
               CPAs, yes.
3
               OK. To the New York Society of
         0.
4
     CPAs, was that also something that you did
5
     while you were in your time at Moody's
6
     Analytics?
7
         A. Yes. Yes, it was.
8
               So post -- can you sort of place it
         Q.
9
     in time anywhere between December of '07 and
10
     when you left?
               I do recall the -- to the best of
11
         A.
12
     my recollection, the internal presentations
13
     were sort of October '08-ish time frame.
14
     There was a series of them.
15
         0.
               So who was the person, the head of
16
     the financial institutions group within
17
     Moody's Investor Services who made the
18
     request to you to make this presentation
19
     internally?
20
               His name -- he was the head of the
         A.
21
     credit policy for -- David Fanger.
22
         Q.
               Fanger, F-a-n-g-e-r?
23
         A. Yes.
24
         Q. And he was head of credit policy
25
     for all --
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1
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2
         A.
               At that time, financial -- he was
3
     the head of credit policy -- to the best of
4
     my recollection, I should say that, he was
     the head of credit policy for financial
5
6
     institutions, and may have been in the U.S.
7
     I just knew him as the head of credit policy
8
     for that group. I believe he is no longer in
9
     that role.
10
               And so just kind of where in
         0.
11
     general within the overall hierarchy of
12
     Moody's would he fit, kind of on the org
13
     chart?
14
               MR. LEBOVITCH: Objection to form.
15
         A.
               Well, let me just, to the extent I
16
     can try, from my memory to --
17
         Q.
              Of course.
18
         A.
              -- recall. So Moody's
19
     Corporation -- and I'm only talking about the
     operating subsidiaries. There is a number of
20
21
     legal subsidiaries, which I --
22
               No. That's -- I appreciate that
         Q.
23
     clarification.
         A.
24
               There was Moody's Corp. at the
25
     head, which is a publicly traded company.
                                                It
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 2
                 MR. LEBOVITCH: Objection. Same
           objection before to the hypothetical.
 3
                 It is very hypothetical. I can't
 4
 5
       really, just based on that question, I can't
 6
       really answer. I mean, the opinion goes to
 7
       the data quality that's been provided to the
 8
       rating agency.
 9
                 MR. PASKIN: OK, let's take a short
10
           break.
11
                 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is
12
           2:55, we are going off the record.
13
                 (Recess)
14
                 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is
15
           3:12, back on the record.
     EXAMINATION BY
16
17
     MR. ADDIS:
18
           O. Hi, Mr. Kolchinsky.
19
           A. How are you.
20
                So it is your opinion that at the
           Q.
21
      times relevant to the issuance of the
22
      securities in this case, the rating agency's
23
      ratings hinged on the proper application of
      loan sampling and loan due diligence
24
25
      processes, correct?
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Page 213 1 KOLCHINSKY - CONFIDENTIAL 2 It is my opinion that those Α. functions would have helped to provide 3 4 correct data for the rating agencies which 5 would then change the rating. 6 Q. So it is your opinion that the 7 ratings hinged on the proper application of loan sampling and loan due diligence 8 9 processes, correct? 10 No, I don't think that that's the **A**. 11 core of the opinion. Obviously what I'm 12 opining on is that the data that was being 13 fed into the rating agency models, if it was correct, the ratings would not have been 14 15 triple A. 16 There is evidence here that the due 17 diligence was insufficient to make the data 18 correct. But I don't think I'm opining on 19 those things that you say. So it is not your opinion here 20 0. today that at the times relevant to the 21 22 issuance of the deals at issue, the relevant 23 rating agencies' ratings hinged upon the 24 proper application of loan sampling and loan due diligence processes? 25